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CLEMENCY IN A TIME OF CRISIS 
Cara H. Drinan* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
At the state level, the power to pardon or commute a criminal 
sentence—that is, to grant clemency—is vested in either the 
Governor, an executive clemency board, or some combination 
thereof. Until very recently, clemency grants were a consistent 
feature of our criminal justice system. In the last four decades, 
though, state clemency grants have declined significantly; in some 
states, clemency seems to have disappeared altogether. In this 
Article, I contend that executive clemency should be revived at the 
state level in response to ongoing systemic criminal justice failings. 
Part I of this Article describes clemency at the state level today. 
Despite judicial and scholarly support for the role of clemency in our 
criminal justice system, state clemency practice fails to live up to its 
theoretical justifications. Part II of this Article makes the case for a 
policy of vigorous clemency on both theoretical and practical 
grounds. Not only was clemency designed, at least in part, to serve 
an error-correcting function, but also, today, there are several 
reasons why state executive actors may be able to use their clemency 
power robustly without suffering politically. In Part III, I address 
questions of implementation. If state executive actors are to pursue 
commutations of sentences or pardons, which inmates should be the 
subject of such pursuits? How can those executive actors best be 
insulated from political pressure? In sum, this Article argues that 
revitalizing state clemency is a valuable and viable component of 
broader criminal justice reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every state grants the governor or some executive body the power 
to grant clemency—that is, the power to pardon or commute a 
criminal sentence.1 This power is deeply rooted in American history,2 
and as recently as the first half of the twentieth century, clemency 
grants were a regular feature of our criminal justice system.3 Even in 
states with traditionally high execution rates, governors granted 
clemency to death row inmates in a substantial number of cases. For 
example, between 1923 and 1972 Texas executed 461 people, but 
during the same time period, Texas governors commuted 100 capital 
sentences.4 Today, state clemency grants have all but disappeared 
from the political landscape.5 Since 1976, when the United States 
reinstated the death penalty,6 Texas has executed 477 people, while 
its governors have granted clemency for only two inmates.7 Some 
capital states have not commuted any death sentences in the post-
Gregg era.8 I discuss a few notable exceptions later in this Article, 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. This paper was 
presented at the Georgia State Law Review Symposium on January 27, 2012. I received helpful 
comments from other Symposium participants and from Anne Traum and Megan La Belle. Justin 
D’Aniello, Elizabeth Edinger and Jennifer Pollack provided diligent research assistance. 
1.  Kathleen Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy?, CRIM. 
JUST., Fall 2009, at 31–32. 
 2. See generally Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 583–605 (1991) (discussing history and origins of clemency). 
 3. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God—or the Governor—Have Mercy: Executive 
Clemency and Executions in Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 212–13 (2000). 
 4. Id. at 213 tbl.1. 
 5. See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States 
from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 353–66 (2003) (discussing the general decline and offering 
explanations). 
 6. In 1976, the Court determined in three separate cases, referred to as “the Gregg decision,” that 
state statutes provided sufficient guided discretion to juries imposing death sentences and that the death 
penalty was constitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). With these decisions, a more than ten-year moratorium 
on the death penalty in America came to an end. See Convicted Georgia Murderer Facing Execution on 
July 1, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1980 (identifying Gary Gilmore as the first inmate to be executed in the 
post-Gregg era). 
 7. See State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (select “Texas” from drop down menu) (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2011). 
 8. For example, no capital sentences have been commuted in either Arizona or Mississippi since 
1976. See Id. (select “Arizona” or “Mississippi” from drop down menu). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/6
2012] CLEMENCY IN A TIME OF CRISIS 1123 
but the overall decline in state clemency grants is consistent and 
pronounced.9 
This anemic notion of state clemency is misguided—even when 
the criminal justice system is functioning fairly and efficiently.10 
Clemency is designed to serve several laudable goals: it “serve[s] as 
a check on the judiciary;”11 it enables error-correction in a criminal 
justice system fraught with mistakes;12 it may “afford relief from 
undue harshness;”13 and it “help[s] ensure that justice is tempered by 
mercy.”14 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy explained in his 2003 
address to the American Bar Association, “[a] people confident in its 
laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.”15 Under the 
best of circumstances, clemency acts as a safety valve and enables 
gestures of compassion. 
However, when the criminal justice system is a shambles—as ours 
is today—the case for clemency is even stronger. By all accounts, the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 
VA. L. REV. 239, 251 (2003) (noting the decline in and infrequent use of clemency from 1973 to 1999). 
 10. In this Article, I focus on the need to revitalize state clemency practice, but scholars have noted 
the infrequent use of clemency at the federal level and have urged reform of the presidential pardon 
power. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Turning Hope-and-Change Talk into Clemency Action for 
Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 59 (2010); Margaret 
Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010). 
 11. Michael A.G. Korengold, Todd A. Noteboom & Sara Gurwitch, And Justice for the Few: The 
Collapse of the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 356 (1996). 
 12. For example, 289 post-conviction DNA exonerations have occurred in the United States. See 
Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 13. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1261 (D. Utah 2004) (quoting Ex Parte 
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925)). 
 14. Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1359–62 (2008) (explaining 
the unique role that clemency and jury nullification can play today when judges have little freedom to 
treat defendants as individuals). 
 15. Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), 
available at http://www.abanow.org/2003/08/speech-by-justice-anthony-kennedy-at-aba-annual-
meeting/. Regarding clemency, Justice Kennedy went on to say: 
The greatest of poets reminds us that mercy is ‘mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes the 
throned monarch better than his crown.’ I hope more lawyers involved in the pardon 
process will say to Chief Executives, “Mr. President,” or “Your Excellency, the 
Governor, this young man has not served his full sentence, but he has served long 
enough. Give him what only you can give him. Give him another chance. Give him a 
priceless gift. Give him liberty.” 
Id. 
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American criminal justice system is in need of an overhaul.16 The 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, meant to safeguard the liberty 
interests of indigent criminal defendants, has been widely described 
as more of a myth than a reality in practice.17 States regularly flout 
their constitutional obligations under the Sixth Amendment,18 while 
defendants rarely, if ever, have a chance to seek redress in federal 
court.19 At the same time, with more than two million adults and 
children behind bars,20 the United States leads the world in its rate of 
incarceration.21 Our prisoners serve longer sentences than they ever 
have before,22 and our states spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
each year to maintain their corrections systems.23 In short, “[o]ur 
resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences 
too long.”24 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Numerous reports and articles have documented the nation’s criminal justice failures, including 
its over-reliance on incarceration, failure to protect the rights of poor criminal defendants, 
disproportionate impact upon people of color, and failure to enable rehabilitation and reentry into 
society. See generally AM. CIV. LIB. UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE (2011) [hereinafter SMART 
REFORM IS POSSIBLE], available at www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf; NAACP, 
MISPLACED PRIORITIES: OVER INCARCERATE, UNDER EDUCATE (2011), available at 
http://naacp.3cdn.net/01d6f368edbe135234_bq0m68x5h.pdf; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. 
 17. See generally STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_d
ef_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (concluding that the promise of 
equal justice for the indigent remains unfulfilled). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 806–10 (2009) (explaining why federal habeas today provides little practical 
relief to most prisoners). 
 20. ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON SCHOOL OF LAW, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST (8th ed. 2008), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-
8th_41.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See also Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron 
Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 312 (2009) (describing legislation in late 
twentieth century that lengthened average prison sentences). 
 23. Between 1982 and 1999 federal, state, and local government spending on corrections went from 
$9 billion to $49 billion. AM. BAR ASS’N., JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORT WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (2004). 
 24. Kennedy, supra note 15. 
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In recent years, scholars have proposed a number of reform 
measures designed to reduce our national reliance on incarceration, 
generating hope in a “decarceration” movement.25 Such measures 
include sentencing reform,26 crime prevention efforts,27 and emphasis 
upon offender re-entry into society.28 Some politicians—including 
those previously perceived as tough-on-crime—have embraced and 
implemented these proposals.29 These are valuable and promising 
developments. In this Article, I argue that robust state clemency 
should also be a piece of the reform puzzle. 
Part I of this Article describes clemency at the state level today. 
Despite judicial and scholarly support for the role of clemency in our 
criminal justice system, state clemency practice fails to live up to its 
theoretical justifications. In many jurisdictions, clemency has fallen 
into disuse altogether; when clemency grants do happen, too many 
appear arbitrary and rooted in favoritism. Part II of this Article makes 
the case for a policy of vigorous clemency on both theoretical and 
practical grounds today. Other scholars have argued for the revival of 
clemency in recent years, especially with respect to discrete inmate 
populations, but most, if not all, assume that clemency will meet a 
hostile political climate. In Part II of this Article, I argue that 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of 
Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (2009); see also Marc Mauer, Sentencing 
Reform: Amid Mass Incarcerations—Guarded Optimism, 26 CRIM. JUST. 27 (2011) (describing basis for 
optimism about sentencing reform). 
 26. After years of criticism, the federal government enacted legislation to reduce the sentencing 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220 
(2010). Because of the recession and prison overcrowding, many jurisdictions have also begun to 
explore sentencing reforms. See, e.g., Ron Jackson, Jr., Alternative Sentencing Programs Show Growing 
Success in Oklahoma, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 27, 2011), http://newsok.com/alternative-sentencing-
programs-show-growing-success-in-oklahoma/article/3552231#ixzz1HtcXbemB (discussing sentencing 
options available). 
 27. For example, scholars are probing the “school to jail” connection and advocating for solutions 
that prevent criminal activity. See Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the 
Antecedents of the School to Jail Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 634-37 (2011) (describing the link). 
 28. See, e.g., Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 
(2006); see also Edward E. Rhine & Anthony C. Thompson, The Reentry Movement in Corrections: 
Resiliency, Fragility and Prospects, 47 CRIM. LAW BULL. 177 (2011). 
 29. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Perry Displays Varied Stance Toward Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/us/politics/rick-perry-displays-varied-stance-toward-
crime.html. 
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clemency today is theoretically justified, and moreover, that it may 
not be politically deleterious under the right circumstances. Part III 
addresses questions of implementation. For example, if state 
executive actors are to pursue commutations of sentences or pardons, 
how can those executive actors best be insulated from political 
pressure? Which inmates should be the subject of such pursuits? I 
offer some preliminary answers to these important questions. In 
conclusion, I note that a revitalized model of state clemency should 
by no means be viewed as a panacea, but it should be viewed as a 
viable and valuable reform measure. 
I. STATE CLEMENCY TODAY 
Clemency in America is an often misunderstood act of executive 
grace.30 Executive clemency includes the power to pardon a criminal 
defendant, reduce a sentence, or grant a stay of execution.31 At the 
state level, the clemency power is vested in the Governor, an 
executive clemency board, or some combination thereof.32 For 
example, Virginia vests its clemency power in the Governor alone, 
while Texas grants the Governor final decision-making authority but 
requires a recommendation of clemency from a board.33 In Ohio, the 
Governor is required to hear from the board, but the board’s 
recommendation is non-binding.34 In a handful of states, a board 
alone makes clemency decisions.35 
                                                                                                                 
 30. First, there are many forms of clemency. See Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 1, at 3 (defining 
forms of clemency). Second, contrary to the rare incidence of clemency grants, clemency is often 
perceived as a widely available source of relief. See, e.g., Alan Prendergast, Clemency for These Six 
Prisoners Could Save Millions and Serve Justice—So Why Won’t Governor Ritter Try it?, 2009 WLNR 
21126425 *2 (Oct. 22, 2009) (“When we went to the legislature to get the law changed for juveniles in 
the adult system, they told us, ‘There’s always clemency,’” recalls Mary Ellen Johnson, director of the 
Pendulum Foundation, a juvenile-justice nonprofit based in Denver. “They were shocked when we told 
them that nobody gets clemency.”). 
 31. Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 1, at 3 (defining forms of clemency). 
 32. See generally State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Dec. 13, 2011) (listing clemency process by 
state). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that “[c]lemency is deeply 
rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic 
remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process 
has been exhausted.”36 Scholars, too, have articulated several 
justifications for the role of clemency in our criminal justice system: 
it can correct errors and amend sentences where parole has been 
abolished;37 it can facilitate re-entry into society when it comes in the 
form of a pardon;38 it can reward rehabilitation in prison and remedy 
gross sentencing disparities among similarly culpable defendants;39 
and it can prompt broad reform by drawing attention to systemic 
failings in the justice system.40 Thus, legal practitioners and scholars 
alike recognize the valuable role that clemency plays in our criminal 
justice system. 
As recently as the mid-twentieth century, state executive actors 
shared this view of clemency—at least to the extent that they 
regularly used their clemency power.41 Today, despite popular 
perception to the contrary,42 state clemency grants have become a 
truly rare occurrence. In all of the nation’s thirty-eight death penalty 
states, there have been only 270 commutations since 1976, and 167 
of those were part of Governor Ryan’s commutation of Illinois’ 
entire death row in 2003.43 In several states there have been only one 
or two commutations of a death sentence in the last few decades, and 
in some states there have been none.44 There is no disputing the fact 
that clemency is no longer a regularly exercised power at the state 
level. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993). 
 37. Rachel Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 
153, 153 (2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Molly M. Gill, Clemency for Lifers: The Only Road Out is the Road Not Taken, 21 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 21, 22 (2009). 
 40. Barkow, supra note 14, at 1361–62 (discussing Governor Ryan’s commutation of death row 
inmates in Illinois and the attention his decision brought to systemic errors). 
 41. Acker & Lanier, supra note 3, at 211–12. 
 42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 43. See generally Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) (listing commutations since 1976 
by state). 
 44. See generally id. 
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When it has been used in recent years, for the most part, clemency 
has not earned a good reputation either in the mainstream media or 
among academics. For example, Governor Charlie Crist’s 2010 
posthumous pardon of Jim Morrison appeared to reflect the instincts 
of a fan rather than a governor.45 Morrison had been convicted of 
indecent exposure at one of his 1969 concerts, and his case had been 
on appeal when the singer died in 1971.46 In his last few months of 
office, then-Governor Crist explained that pursuing a pardon for 
Morrison was “the right thing to do.”47 He said at the time: 
In some ways it seems like a tragic conclusion to a young 
man’s life to have maybe this be a lasting legacy, where 
we’re not even sure that it actually occurred. The more that 
I’ve read about the case and the more I get briefed on it, the 
more convinced I am that maybe an injustice has been done 
here.48 
The Florida Clemency Board unanimously agreed to pardon 
Morrison in Crist’s last month of office.49 
In light of Morrison’s death, his pardon case was not time-
sensitive, and moreover, Governor Crist had far more important 
clemency cases to consider. In May, 2010, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile non-
homicide offender violates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.50 As a result of the Graham decision, Florida 
was effectively under a Supreme Court mandate to amend the life-
without-parole sentences of its juvenile non-homicide offenders. 
Because of the state legislature’s inability to pass corrective 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Dave Itzkoff, Jim Morrison is Candidate for Pardon in ‘69 Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, 
at A16 (noting the governor “seemed to side with many Doors fans in explaining his decision to seek a 
pardon for Morrison” and that the two both attended Florida State University). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Susan Candiotti, Doors Singer Jim Morrison Wins Indecent Exposure Pardon, CNN (Dec. 9, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-09/entertainment/ent.jim.morrison.pardon_1_jim-morrison-
exposure-charge-indecent-exposure?_s=PM:SHOWBIZ. 
 50. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
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legislation and the resulting confusion for state court judges, it would 
have been prudent for Crist to seek executive clemency in order to 
commute the sentences of the affected juvenile offenders.51 Instead, 
as the local newspapers reported, Governor Crist sought clemency for 
a deceased singer whom he had once admired.52 
In contrast, many people were stunned by the denial of clemency 
in the case of Troy Davis. Mr. Davis had been convicted of killing a 
Georgia police officer in 1989, and in the wake of his conviction, 
several of the witnesses who had testified against him recanted their 
testimony.53 In a rare occurrence, the United States Supreme Court 
remanded Mr. Davis’s case for an evidentiary hearing regarding his 
innocence.54 Despite the fact that the District Court failed to find 
enough evidence to overturn the conviction, serious doubts about Mr. 
Davis’s guilt remained.55 In addition, there was unprecedented 
international support for clemency in Mr. Davis’s case, including 
personal pleas for mercy from Pope Benedict the XVI, the former 
Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court, and President Carter.56 
Despite this groundswell of support for mercy in Davis’s case, the 
Georgia Board of Pardons denied clemency, and the state executed 
Mr. Davis on September 21, 2011.57 In light of examples like these, it 
is no wonder much of the public is skeptical of clemency and views it 
as an exercise of favoritism rather than reasoned mercy.58 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See generally Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900005 (discussing the task of 
implementing the Graham decision and its particular application to Florida). 
 52. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also Brendan Farrington, Charlie Crist Wants the 
Doors’ Jim Morrison Pardoned, NAPLESNEWS.COM (Nov. 17, 2010, 10:42 P.M.), 
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/nov/17/charlie-crist-wants-doors-jim-morrison-pardoned/. 
 53. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Orders New Look at Death Row Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, 
at A15. 
 54. Adam Liptak, Justices Deny New Appeal by Convict in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at 
A20 (describing the Supreme Court’s remand order). 
 55. Editorial, A Grievous Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/opinion/a-grievous-wrong-on-georgias-death-row.html (describing 
doubts that remained the day before Mr. Davis’s execution). 
 56. Id.; see also Bill Rankin & Rhonda Cook, Troy Davis’ Life in Board’s Hands, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2011, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/troy-davis-life-in-1183243.html. 
 57. Kim Severson, Troy Davis Executed in Georgia After 4-Hour Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/us/final-pleas-and-vigils-in-troy-davis-
execution.html. 
 58. Cf. Berman, supra note 10, at 69 (“Many, if not most, Americans now likely associate the 
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Like much of the public, academics have been highly critical of 
state clemency practices. The Supreme Court has consistently taken 
the position that “a petition for commutation, like an appeal for 
clemency, ‘is simply a unilateral hope,’”59 and the Court has declined 
to interfere with state clemency procedures.60 As a result, there is 
great variety in state clemency application procedures,61 as well as in 
the resources made available to applicants. Applicants have 
challenged the lack of a public clemency hearing, the absence of an 
explanation for clemency denial, the absence of clemency records, 
and the lack of a right to clemency counsel. Courts have uniformly 
rejected these challenges.62 Scholars have decried this status quo in 
clemency procedure, noting that procedures are largely 
“standardless,” decisions are “discretionary,” and results are 
“unreviewable.”63 Yet, in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
this area, if procedural reform is to happen, it will need to come from 
the states themselves. 
In the next part of this Article, I argue that clemency can and 
should be put to better, more regular use. 
                                                                                                                 
clemency power with cronyism and scandal, and few have reason to understand the noble and sensible 
goals that the Framers sought to further by guaranteeing this power to the president in the 
Constitution.”). 
 59. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998) (holding that Ohio clemency 
procedures allowing the applicant to be interviewed without counsel violated neither the Due Process 
Clause nor the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
 60. Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer articulated the position that 
states need to provide some “minimal procedural safeguards [that] apply to clemency proceedings.” Id. 
at 289. For example, she explained: “Judicial intervention might . . . be warranted in the face of a 
scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case 
where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.” Id.; see also Conn. Bd. 
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (holding that Connecticut clemency procedure did 
not violate the Due Process clause in failing to provide explanation for denial of clemency); Mary-Beth 
Moylan & Linda E. Carter, Clemency in California Capital Cases, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 37, 50–53 
(2009) (describing the lack of successful Due Process challenges to state clemency procedures). 
 61. See generally Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 1. 
 62. Moylan & Carter, supra note 60, at 53. 
 63. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 255, 257 (1990); see also Adam Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital 
Clemency, 17 J. L. & POL. 669 (2001) (arguing for Due Process protections in clemency procedures); 
Kobil, supra note 2, at 633–36 (discussing proposals for reforming clemency procedure). 
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II. THE CASE FOR CLEMENCY IN A TIME OF CRISIS 
Over the last few decades, states have consistently shirked their 
obligation to provide indigent criminal defendants with effective 
representation at trial, and at the same time, they have consistently 
increased the consequences for criminal acts and the number of 
people behind bars. This should not be surprising as scholars have 
long recognized the political process challenge presented by criminal 
justice reform; legislative bodies tend to devalue the rights of 
indigent criminal defendants who “have no lobby,” while they 
overvalue the short-term gains generated by tough-on-crime stances. 
While the economic crisis has brought renewed attention to criminal 
justice matters—generating some hope in lasting reform—robust 
state clemency has a role to play in the reform movement. In this Part 
of the paper, I make the case for clemency in a time of crisis. First, I 
argue that robust clemency is theoretically justified in light of 
ongoing, entrenched criminal justice failings. Second, I suggest that 
recent experience calls into question the perceived political risk of 
clemency grants. 
A.   Robust Clemency Today Is Theoretically Justified 
As mentioned at the outset, courts and scholars have recognized 
that clemency serves several important functions: it can be a check 
on the judiciary; it can be a “safety-valve” that allows for error-
correction; and it can be an opportunity for state acts of mercy. There 
may be strong theoretical arguments to be made for reviving 
clemency in all three of these lights, but in this Article, my primary 
focus is on clemency in its error-correction capacity. I conceive of 
clemency as an error-corrector in two specific ways. First, clemency 
may be justified to correct the errors of systemic indigent defense 
failings. Second, clemency may be justified to correct the error of 
draconian sentencing enhancements over the last three decades. In 
this sub-section, I address each theoretical justification in turn. 
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1. Clemency to Correct Systemic Defense Errors 
In 2003, after a three-year study, Republican Illinois Governor 
George Ryan determined that the state’s criminal justice system was 
deeply flawed and prone to error.64 Consequently, Ryan used his 
clemency power to commute the sentences of the state’s entire death 
row population and to pardon four inmates.65 With respect to the 
seventeen exonerations that had taken place in Illinois, Ryan said: 
[I]n almost every one of the exonerated seventeen, we not 
only have breakdowns in the system with police, 
prosecutors and judges, we have terrible cases of shabby 
defense lawyers. There is just no way to sugarcoat it. There 
are defense attorneys that did not consult with their clients, 
did not investigate the case and were completely 
unqualified to handle complex death penalty cases. They 
often didn’t put much effort into fighting a death 
sentence.66 
Ryan left office days after his commutation announcement, but the 
findings of his Capital Punishment Commission had a lasting impact. 
There were no executions under subsequent governors, and in March 
of 2011, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law a statewide ban 
on the death penalty, while commuting the death sentences of fifteen 
death row inmates to life in prison.67 
The lack of effective representation identified by Ryan’s Capital 
Punishment Commission is neither unique to capital cases nor to the 
state of Illinois. Rather, the indigent defense crisis is national in 
scope and has only deepened since the 2008 recession.68 Eighty 
                                                                                                                 
 64. George Ryan, Governor of Ill., Speech before Northwestern University College of Law (Jan 11, 
2003), in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/national/11CND-RTEX.html. 
 65. Id.; Jodi Wilgoren, 4 Death Row Inmates are Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/us/4-death-row-inmates-are-pardoned.html. 
 66. Ryan, supra note 64. 
 67. Ray Long, Illinois Death Penalty Ban Takes Effect Friday, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 30, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-30/news/chi-illinois-death-penalty-ban-takes-effect-friday-
20110630_1_death-penalty-maximum-security-prisons-pontiac-correctional-center. 
 68. A full description of the national indigent defense crisis is outside the scope of this Article, but 
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percent of criminal defendants are poor,69 and public defense systems 
across the board receive far too little funding to represent these 
individuals.70 As a result, public defenders have workloads that 
exceed nationally recommended guidelines—sometimes egregiously 
so.71 A 2009 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court dealing with 
defender workloads found that defenders were spending less than 
eight hours on appellate and capital cases.72 In other cash-strapped 
jurisdictions, lawyers are hired to represent indigent criminal 
defendants on the basis of their expedience, rather than their 
experience or lawyering skill.73 In many jurisdictions, the most 
fundamental problem with the defense system is its lack of 
independence from judicial and political interference.74 National 
studies of indigent defense services over several decades have all 
                                                                                                                 
its existence and symptoms have been well documented by scholars and practitioners. See, e.g., NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S 
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE], available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf; JUSTICE DENIED, 
supra note 16; GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 17; Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: 
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994); 
Adam Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85 (2007); 
Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007); 
Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). 
 69. Cf. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 50 (2010). 
 70. Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s 
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 491 (2010). 
 71. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: COUNTY-BASED AND 
LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf (reporting that 73% of county-based public 
defender offices exceeded the maximum recommended number of cases per year per attorney); BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS 
(2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf (reporting that 79%, or 15 of 19 
state offices, exceeded the maximum recommended number of felony and misdemeanor cases per 
attorney). 
 72. State ex rel. Mo. Public Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Mo. 2009) (“The 
statewide public defender system, under rules adopted by the commission, had the capacity last fiscal 
year to spend only 7.7 hours per case, including trial, appellate and capital cases.”). 
 73. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 68, at 11–12 (discussing witness testimony to this 
effect); see also AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION, FAILING GIDEON: UTAH’S FLAWED COUNTY-BY-COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM (2011), http://www.acluutah.org/Failing_Gideon.pdf (discussing this 
dynamic in Utah, where there is no public funding or oversight of county-run defender programs). 
 74. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 17, at 20–21. 
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come to the conclusion that “indigent defense systems are struggling” 
and “many are truly failing.”75 
Unfortunately, state legislative and judicial bodies have been 
reticent to enact sweeping indigent defense reform. To begin, the 
political pressure to be perceived as tough on crime has made it 
historically difficult for lawmakers to pursue indigent defense 
reform.76 At the same time, state courts have been hesitant to 
intervene in challenges to indigent defense systems, and the federal 
courts historically have been unavailable because of federalism 
principles.77 Only very recently, as the economy fell into recession, 
have lawmakers been willing to explore reform efforts that would 
benefit taxpayers and indigent defendants alike.78 
Accordingly, clemency grants may be justified as a check on 
judicial and legislative bodies that have been unable (or unwilling) to 
insist upon indigent defense reform. Simply because a state actor 
justifies clemency on the basis of a systemic problem, like a broken 
indigent defense system, does not require the state actor to grant 
clemency on a systemic basis. Rather, it may mean that state 
executive actors pay particular attention to clemency applications that 
reflect the symptoms of a broken indigent defense system. 
For example, in 2002, Leonard Rojas was executed in Texas 
despite his legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.79 
Under state law, Mr. Rojas’s habeas attorney was required to conduct 
a thorough investigation. Instead, his lawyer admitted in an affidavit 
that he spoke with Rojas only once, read the trial transcript, spoke to 
one trial attorney, and did no independent investigation.80 In addition, 
                                                                                                                 
 75. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 16, at 2 (italics omitted). 
 76. James Forman, Jr. Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 994 (2010) 
(“[P]oliticians make careers out of being tough on crime, only to lose elections to those who are yet 
tougher.”). 
 77. A full discussion of systemic indigent defense litigation is outside the scope of this Article. For 
an overview, see Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009); see also Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do To 
Improve the Quality of Criminal Justice Services, 63 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 293 (2002). 
 78. See generally SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE, supra note 16 (identifying trend of states reforming 
in part out of fiscal need). 
 79. Brandi Grissom, Scrutinizing Perry’s Extensive Execution Record, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at 
A19 (discussing the Rojas case). 
 80. Janet Elliott, Judges Criticize Court of Criminal Appeals Decision, HOUSTON CHRON. (Feb. 14, 
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Mr. Rojas’s counsel failed to tell him that he lost his appeal for state 
habeas relief, and without consulting Rojas, his lawyer waived 
Rojas’s right to a federal habeas petition.81 Perhaps most damning, 
when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals appointed the attorney to 
represent Mr. Rojas in his capital post-conviction review, the 
attorney had already received two probated suspensions from the 
State Bar of Texas.82 
In 2002, when Mr. Rojas sought clemency, countless reports had 
been generated criticizing the state’s indigent defense services, 
particularly in light of its highly punitive practices.83 When an inmate 
grounds his appeal for clemency in a claim of grossly ineffective 
representation, as Mr. Rojas did, state actors should pay attention—
especially if the claim is indicative of systemic failures. While such 
failures require legislative correction in the long run, state actors can 
and should use clemency as a tool to correct errors that flow from a 
broken system. In doing so, executive actors may also prompt 
legislative attention. 
2. Clemency to Correct Sentencing Policy Errors 
It is also true that clemency grants may be theoretically justified to 
correct the problem of our national addiction to incarceration. There 
is no dispute that America today is plagued by its mass 
incarceration.84 Some scholars trace this emphasis on incarceration 
back to Barry Goldwater’s 1964 Presidential campaign,85 while 
                                                                                                                 
2003), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judges-criticize-Court-of-Criminal-Appeals-
2094712.php. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., TEX. APPLESEED, FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE 
PRACTICES (2000), http://www.texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects_fairDefense_fairref.pdf (identifying 
systemic shortcomings). 
 84. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass 
Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2011) (“That the last several decades have seen an explosion 
of Americans’ reliance on imprisonment as a penal sanction is unquestioned. So vast has this expansion 
been that the term ‘mass incarceration’ has entered scholarly vocabulary as a way of describing this 
phenomenon.” (footnote omitted)). 
 85. Michael A. Simons, Sense and Sentencing: Our Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & 
ECON. DEV. 153, 158 (2010) (“In 1964, in the face of rising crime rates, presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater made being ‘tough on crime’ a national issue. Although Goldwater did not win the election, 
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others point to President Nixon’s rhetoric of the 1970s, both of which 
placed great emphasis upon the danger of criminals and the need to 
be tough on crime.86 In any event, there is consensus that beginning 
around 1980, penal policy in America shifted dramatically.87 Prison 
systems moved away from an emphasis upon preventing future 
criminal activity to incapacitating criminals through prolonged 
detention.88 Since the 1970s, when a perceived spike in the crime rate 
prompted politicians to pursue tough-on-crime policies,89 the 
American prison population has grown exponentially.90 Moreover, 
between 1970 and today, several changes in the American criminal 
justice system converged to generate our status as the world’s leading 
incarcerator: the introduction of mandatory minimums and much 
longer average prison sentences; the passage of “three-strikes” 
legislation which has created a pool of inmates serving life sentences; 
legislation in many states eliminating parole;91 and the expansion of 
what constitutes criminal behavior.92 As is now apparent, the long-
term consequences of enacting draconian sentencing policies have 
been tremendous: we are now a nation identified by its mass 
incarceration, and our incarceration habits are incredibly expensive. 
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata,93 requiring 
the reduction of California’s prison population, has brought 
mainstream media attention to the blight of America’s over-reliance 
                                                                                                                 
his campaign tactic changed the politics of crime on the national stage.”). 
 86. Anthony C. Thompson, Unlocking Democracy: Examining the Collateral Consequences of Mass 
Incarceration on Black Political Power, 54 HOW. L.J. 587, 619–20 (2010) (describing Nixon’s tough-
on-crime platform and its impact upon the African-American community). 
 87. See Clear & Austin, supra note 22, at 312. 
 88. Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends, 1975–2025, 26 CRIME & JUST. 163, 176–79 (1999) 
(discussing the shift away from rehabilitative model in 1974). 
 89. THE JFA INSTITUTE, UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S PRISON 
POPULATION 5–6 (2007). 
 90. Id. In 1970, there were less than 200,000 people in prison; by 2006, there were approximately 
1.6 million people in prison. Id. at 3. For a visual of this growth from 1980 to 2009, see Key Facts at a 
Glance, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/corr2.cfm (last modified Feb. 23, 
2012). 
 91. Adam Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Incarceration Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 47, 54-57 (2008) (discussing these and other causes). 
 92. For example, over the last three decades there has been an explosion in the volume of 
misdemeanor cases nationwide. See MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 68, at 11; Roberts, 
supra note 68, at 281. 
 93. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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on incarceration. As Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Plata described, 
California’s prison system currently houses almost twice the inmates 
for which its facilities were designed.94 As a result, “as many as 200 
prisoners may live in a gymnasium, monitored by as few as two or 
three correctional officers,” while “[a]s many as 54 prisoners may 
share a single toilet.”95 Prisoners face increased exposure to 
infectious disease;96 suicidal inmates are housed in “telephone-booth 
sized cages without toilets” while awaiting a treatment bed;97 and the 
“[c]ramped conditions promote unrest and violence, making it 
difficult for prison officials to monitor and control the prison 
population.”98 Because of this unsafe and chaotic environment, the 
prison system cannot hire and retain adequate staff with appropriate 
training.99 In 2006, four years before the Supreme Court reviewed 
California’s prison conditions, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
declared a state of emergency in the state prison system, explaining 
that “immediate action” was “necessary to prevent death and harm 
caused by California’s severe prison overcrowding.”100 
While California’s prison crisis is “exceptional,”101 the state’s 
appetite for incarceration is by no means unique. To the contrary, 
almost every state in the nation faces similar problems regarding 
prison costs and overcrowding.102 Alabama’s prison system holds 
almost twice the inmates for which its facilities were designed, while 
Delaware, Illinois, North Dakota, Massachusetts, and Hawaii all have 
prison capacity rates hovering around 150%.103 Other states are 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id. at 1923. 
 95. Id. at 1924. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1933. 
 99. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927 (“Prisons were unable to retain sufficient numbers of competent 
medical staff and would ‘hire any doctor who had “a license, a pulse and a pair of shoes.”’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 100. Id. at 1924. 
 101. Id. at 1923. 
 102. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative States, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A14 (discussing national issue of prison overcrowding and states’ 
increasing willingness to explore alternatives to incarceration). 
 103. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2009 (2010), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (based on custody population as a percentage 
of lowest capacity). 
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exploring measures such as early release and electronic monitoring in 
order to stave off prison overcrowding.104 
As the Plata Court described, this kind of prison overcrowding is 
not simply a matter of inconvenience for inmates who are forced to 
live in cramped quarters. Rather, overcrowding leads to the spread of 
infectious disease; causes prisoner unrest and violence; exacerbates 
mental illness; deprives inmates of timely access to emergency 
medical services; and renders the prison unable to hire and retain 
adequate staff. Indeed, as the Plata Court held, these conditions are 
“cruel and unusual.”105 
At the same time, prison overcrowding is incredibly expensive.106 
On average, states spend approximately $22,000 per inmate 
annually.107 Massachusetts spends more than $37,000 per inmate, 
while Alabama spends only $8,000 per inmate annually.108 As the 
rate of incarceration has increased over time, state prison 
expenditures have ballooned. In 2008, Pennsylvania spent 1.6 billion 
dollars on prisons,109 while California spends more than four billion 
dollars annually on its prison expenses.110 Moreover, these figures do 
not reflect the opportunity cost of mass incarceration. States have a 
finite amount of money to spend each year; when prison costs are 
excessive, those costs erode the states’ ability to spend money on 
education, infrastructure, courts, and other public services. For 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Natasha Alladina, Note, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska Criminal Justice 
System: A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 126 (2011); 
Tom Barnes, State Hopes New Prisons, Early Release Cut Crowding, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 
27, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg08301/923163-85.stm. 
 105. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910 (2011). 
 106. Ironically, while it is expensive to incarcerate individuals, most states do not spend what they 
should in order to provide inmates with substance abuse treatment, mental health services, educational 
opportunities and other resources known to foster re-entry into society and to reduce recidivism. For 
example, Alabama has the fourth highest rate of incarceration in the nation, and its prisons are operating 
at 200% capacity. Yet, the state spends well below the national average per inmate. See JAMES J. 
STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 (2004), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf; Corrections Statistics by State, NAT’L 
INST. CORR., http://nicic.gov/StateStats/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 107. STEPHAN, supra note 106, at 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Jeff Hawkes, Recidivism: The Point of No Return, INTELLIGENCER J., May 1, 2008, at B1, 
available at 
http://lancasteronline.com/article/local/220700_Recidivism—The-point-of-no-return.html. 
 110. STEPHAN, supra note 106, at 2. 
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example, Alabama’s prison expenditures increased by nearly 45% 
between 2000 and 2004, while its budget for schools increased only 
7.5%.111 Collectively, the United States spends $70 billion a year to 
incarcerate its more than two million prisoners.112 
As Professors Clear and Austin have described, “[T]he size of a 
prison population is completely determined by two factors: how 
many people go to prison and how long they stay.”113 Accordingly, 
there are only two ways to reduce a prison population: reduce the 
number of people who enter prison or shorten the length of their 
stay.114 State legislative and judicial bodies have responded in recent 
years to this mass incarceration epidemic, and state executive actors 
should too. For example, in the last few years, Texas, Kansas, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio have all passed 
bipartisan criminal justice reform legislation designed to reduce 
prison populations and costs.115 These bills have mandated non-
prison punishments for certain offenses and expanded the terms of 
parole eligibility.116 
State judges are also aware of burgeoning prison and corrections 
expenses. Last year, Missouri’s state sentencing board began 
providing state judges with the cost of a given punishment.117 As 
judges consider what punishment to impose, they can take into 
account the fiscal difference between, for example, incarceration and 
probation.118 Judges and lawmakers are becoming increasingly aware 
of the fact that “even if we get significant benefits from incarceration, 
that comes at a significant cost.”119 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Excessive Sentences, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
http://www.eji.org/eji/prisons/excessivesentences (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 112. Editorial, Cutting Prison Costs is a Worthy Cause, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cutting-prison-costs-is-a-worthy-
cause/2011/04/13/AF4er6vD_story.html. 
 113. Clear & Austin, supra note 22, at 312. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE, supra note 16. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Monica Davey, Touching Off Debate, Missouri Tells Judges Costs of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 18, 2010, at A1. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (quoting law professor Douglas A. Berman). 
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Executive clemency can provide yet another tool in dismantling 
corrections policies that have led to years of prison expansion and 
have drained the public fisc. As with clemency grants made in 
recognition of failing defense systems, grants made in recognition of 
ill-advised corrections policies need not be made on a systemic or 
blanket basis. Rather, state executive actors should be cognizant of 
the excessive sentences that have been imposed in the last few 
decades, and when considering clemency applications, they should be 
looking for cases where the inmate can safely re-enter society and 
where taxpayer dollars can be saved at the same time. 
Even if one accepts the proposition that state actors are justified in 
granting clemency on error-correcting grounds, as I have argued in 
this section, one may still query whether such a course of action is 
politically viable. In the next sub-Part, I turn to that issue. 
B. Robust Clemency Today is Politically Viable 
In the last few years, and particularly in the wake of the 2008 
economic decline, other scholars have noted that clemency has fallen 
into virtual extinction and have argued for its revival, especially with 
respect to discrete inmate populations. For example, scholars have 
called for clemency with respect to women who were convicted of 
murder when they acted in self-defense against their long-time 
batterer;120 others have called for clemency regarding the thousands 
of individuals serving long sentences for non-violent drug 
offenses.121 In the wake of Graham v. Florida,122 some scholars have 
called for clemency to commute the sentences of juveniles serving 
life-without-parole sentences.123 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See, e.g., Carol Jacobsen, Kammy Mizga, & Lynn D’Ori, Battered Women, Homicide 
Convictions, and Sentencing: The Case for Clemency, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31 (2007); see also 
Bridget B. Romero et al., The Missouri Battered Women’s Clemency Coalition: A Collaborative Effort 
in Justice for Eleven Missouri Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 193 (2004). 
 121. See generally Berman, supra note 10; Molly M. Gill, Clemency Today, Reform Tomorrow, 20 
FED. SENT’G REP. 318 (2007), available at 2007 WL 5658936. 
 122. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding life-without-parole sentence unconstitutional 
for non-homicide juvenile offenders); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2641 
(2011). 
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These proposals assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
attempts to expand the use of clemency at the state level will meet a 
hostile political climate.124 
This assumption should not be surprising: decades of conventional 
wisdom and mainstream press accounts present executive clemency 
as “political suicide.”125 In 1992, then-Governor Clinton refused to 
grant clemency to Arkansas death-row inmate, Rickey Ray Rector, 
despite arguments that Rector was too mentally impaired to 
understand his own pending execution.126 Clinton’s refusal to grant 
clemency in Rector’s case was widely recognized as a political 
decision, designed to stave off Republican criticism that he was soft 
on crime.127 In 2010, California’s Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
reversed the California Parole Board’s decision to free dozens of 
inmates, and there was a political dynamic to the decision. Many of 
the inmates whom the Board had recommended for clemency had not 
been the “trigger-man” in homicide crimes; some of them had no 
prior criminal record.128 Defense lawyers were not surprised by the 
denial of clemency and explained that the “former governor used that 
power to burnish a reputation as a hard-nosed law-and-order 
governor.”129 In fact, when Governor Schwarzenegger commuted the 
sentence of one inmate from sixteen to seven years under 
circumstances that seemed blatantly grounded in favoritism, 
California Republicans issued a statement rebuking the Governor—
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Barkow, supra note 37, at 153 (“Politicians remain afraid of soft-on-crime accusations or 
facing a Willie Horton-style advertisement should an individual on the receiving end of a pardon or 
commutation go on to commit another crime.”); Thompson, supra note 123, at 2699–700 (describing 
clemency as a political act with political consequences). 
 125. Korengold, Noteboom, & Gurwitch, supra note 11, at 363–65 (discussing the “political suicide” 
issue); see also LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive Political Speech from the 1970s to 2008: A 
Broadcaster’s Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241, 262–64 (2008) 
(describing the Willie Horton ad campaign and its portrayal of Presidential Candidate Dukakis as soft-
on-crime because of a Massachusetts prison furlough policy). 
 126. Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on 
Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, § 1, at 18. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Jack Dolan, Schwarzenegger Was Inconsistent on Clemency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. 
 129. Id. 
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not for nepotism, but for “undermin[ing] the party’s message of 
being tough on crime while advocating for the rights of victims.”130 
One may ask then: why would any state actor want to take an 
enormous political risk by reviving the use of clemency, as I have 
suggested? In this subsection, I suggest several reasons why the 
rhetoric around clemency may overstate the risk associated with 
politicians using their clemency power today.  
To begin, there is very little empirical research on clemency 
grants, and most of the work that has been done has focused on 
defendant characteristics that may affect clemency decisions, such as 
age, sex, and state of sentencing.131 An even smaller subset of 
research looks at the nexus between political factors, such as whether 
a governor faces reelection, and grants of clemency.132 The little data 
that examines this nexus, though, suggests that the connection may 
be more tenuous than the rhetoric suggests. 
Professor Heise conducted an empirical study in 2003 that was the 
first to examine the effect that political factors, structural factors, and 
defendant characteristics had on clemency grants over several 
decades of clemency decisions.133 Contrary to prevailing assumptions 
about the politicization of clemency grants, none of the political 
variables that Heise considered had a statistically significant impact 
on state clemency grants.134 Heise leaves room for the possibility that 
there is, in fact, a connection, but that the connection evades 
empirical analysis and is instead idiosyncratic and case-specific.135 
Still, Heise’s work undermines the idea that there is a powerful 
connection between political variables, especially re-election 
concerns, and clemency grants. 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Tom Verdin, Schwarzenegger Clemency Denounced by California G.O.P., HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 20, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/20/schwarzenegger-clemency-
d_0_n_838179.html. 
 131. Heise, supra note 9, at 259–60. 
 132. Id. at 260–61. 
 133. Id. at 262. 
 134. Id. at 296 (“Unexpectedly, none of the political variables examined in this study achieved 
statistical significance.”). 
 135. Id. at 296–97. 
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Voter sentiments, as reflected in criminal decision-making and in 
recent polls, further suggest that clemency grants today may not be 
politically harmful. Since 1999, the number of death sentences has 
dropped dramatically, from 277 in 1999 to 78 last year.136 A 2010 
study conducted by the Lake Research Group found growing support 
among voters for alternatives to the death penalty in murder cases. 
Sixty-one percent of voters would choose a punishment other than 
death for murder.137 Moreover, in death penalty states a majority of 
voters said that a representative’s action to repeal the death penalty 
would not impact their vote (38%) or would impact it favorably 
(24%).138 These results are consistent with the earlier finding that 
“the greatest concern among voters regarding the death penalty is the 
danger that an innocent person may be executed.”139 These findings 
reveal a very different set of voter beliefs than prevailed even a few 
decades ago. Further, they may serve as a proxy for voter amenability 
to clemency grants under the right circumstances. 
There will always be political actors who will try to turn clemency 
grants into a political opportunity. As a result, it is tempting to 
conclude that our nation will never return to the model of state 
clemency that prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Such a conclusion, though, overlooks several changes, especially in 
recent years, that have the potential to facilitate robust state 
clemency. 
First, there are recent examples of state actors who used their 
clemency power in a meaningful way without suffering tremendous 
political consequences. Professor Barkow cites Arkansas Governor 
Mike Huckabee, Virginia Governor Tim Kaine, and Maryland 
Governor Robert Ehrlich as examples of Governors who fit this 
profile.140 This is not to say that their clemency actions were never 
                                                                                                                 
 136. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Facts About the Death Penalty (updated Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
 137. Poll Shows Growing Support for Alternatives to the Death Penalty; Capital Punishment Ranked 
Lowest Among Budget Priorities, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pollresults#Press_Release. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Korengold, Noteboom, & Gurwich supra note 11, at 365. 
 140. Barkow, supra note 14, at 153. 
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mentioned by their political opponents, but rather that their clemency 
actions were not determinative of their political careers. During 
Governor Huckabee’s bid for President in 2007, his opponents 
criticized his numerous clemency grants,141 and, in particular, the fact 
that he had supported the parole of a convicted rapist who was 
subsequently convicted of raping and murdering a Missouri woman 
within one year of his release.142 However, Huckabee made 
numerous clemency grants during his first term as Governor in 
Arkansas, 143 and he was reelected in that state twice. Moreover, his 
decision to bow out of the Republican presidential primary most 
likely had more to do with funding than any other factor, certainly 
more than his clemency record.144 Finally, before he announced his 
decision not to run for President in 2012, “[he] had been showing 
strong poll numbers, among some of the strongest of his party’s 
possible contenders.”145 If Huckabee was able to grant clemency to 
more than a 1,000 people during his years as Governor and be a 
serious contender in two presidential elections, perhaps the rhetoric 
of clemency as political suicide is overblown. 
One may say the same with respect to Governor Ehrlich and 
Governor Kaine. While Governor, Ehrlich reversed the Maryland 
trend of refusing clemency and was praised in the press for doing 
so.146 The fact that he was a one-term governor in the state was most 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Michael Luo, Romney Takes On a Rising Huckabee, Comparing Records, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2007, at A26 (describing a Mitt Romney ad that criticized Huckabee’s 1033 commutations and 
pardons). 
 142. Huckabee’s Role in Rapist’s Parole Comes Under Fresh Scrutiny, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 5, 
2007), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-12-05/politics/huckabee.dumond_1_mike-huckabee-arkansas-
governor-wayne-dumond?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
 143. Barkow, supra note 14, at 153. 
 144. Huckabee Bows to Inevitable, Ends G.O.P. Run, CNN POLITICS (Mar. 5, 2008), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-03-05/politics/huckabee_1_mike-huckabee-gop-straw-poll-john-
mccain?_s=PM:POLITICS (noting that Mike Huckabee raised nearly $13 million during his campaign 
as compared to John McCain’s nearly $55 million and Mitt Romney’s $90 million). 
 145. Jim Rutenberg, After Hinting Otherwise, Huckabee Says He Won’t Run for President, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2011, at A20. 
 146. See, e.g., Dan Rodricks, Clemency Cases: A Tale of Two Governors, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 25, 
2010, at 25A (comparing current Governor O’Malley’s refusal to grant relief in several high-profile 
cases with Ehrlich’s office making clemency a “priority); see also, Editorial, Mr. Ehrlich and Clemency, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/26/AR2006082600599.html (noting that his clemency practices had not 
caused him “to be branded ‘soft on crime’”). 
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likely because he was a Republican candidate in a state with twice as 
many registered Democrats as Republicans rather than a reflection of 
his clemency practices.147 Governor Kaine also used his clemency 
power vigorously,148 and today polls suggest that Kaine will be a 
strong contender in the 2012 Virginia Senate race.149 
More recently, Ohio Governor John Kasich and Oregon Governor 
John Kitzhaber have made several high-profile clemency decisions 
within their first year in office. In November of 2011, Governor 
Kitzhaber, a Democrat, stopped a pending execution and declared a 
moratorium on the death penalty in Oregon.150 Describing his action 
as only the grant of a “temporary reprieve,” Kitzhaber asked the state 
legislature to bring potential reforms to the 2013 legislative 
session.151 Governor Kasich, a Republican who also came to office in 
2010, has already commuted two death sentences to life-without-
parole. In one case, Kasich explained there was “no doubt that the 
defendant played a significant, material role in this heinous crime, 
but precise details of that role are frustratingly unclear to the point 
that Ohio shouldn’t deliver the ultimate penalty in this case.”152 In the 
second case, Kasich cited the defendant’s young age at the time of 
the murder and his “brutally abusive upbringing.”153 In a non-capital 
case, Kasich granted clemency to a mother who had fraudulently 
enrolled her children in a neighboring school district.154 By reducing 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Julie Bykowicz, Annie Linskey, & Liz Kay, O’Malley Defeats Ehrlich, BALTIMORE SUN 
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-03/news/bs-md-governor-election-results-
20101102_1_democrat-o-malley-katie-curran-o-malley-martin-o-malley. 
 148. Barkow, supra note 14, at 153. 
 149. See Dead Heat In Virginia Senate Race, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Voters Split On 
Obama Job Approval, But Like Him, QUINNIPIAC U. (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x5822.xml?ReleaseID=1621. 
 150. William Yardley, Oregon’s Governor Says He Will Not Allow Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
2011, at A14. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Alan Johnson, Kasich Commutes Convicted Killer’s Sentence to Life Without Parole, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 8, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/08/kasich-
spares-life-of-convicted-double-murderer.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. Alan Johnson, Kasich Spares Killer’s Life, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/27/kasich-spares-killers-life.html (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 154. Alan Johnson, Kasich Reduces Sentence for Akron Mom in School-Residency Case, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/07/akron-mom-
williams-bolar.html. 
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her sentence and imposing several conditions on the mother, Kasich 
stated that he was giving the mother “a second chance,” not “a 
pass.”155 Kasich’s latter move was especially courageous because the 
Ohio Parole Board, which makes recommendations to the Governor 
regarding clemency, had issued a unanimous recommendation to 
deny clemency in the mother’s case.156 The Parole Board said that the 
mother was “deceitful” and faced the same problems as “any other 
working parent.”157 Nonetheless, Kasich found her sentence 
excessive and reduced her felony conviction to a misdemeanor.158 
It is too early to determine whether Kasich and Kitzhaber will 
suffer long-term political consequences from their clemency 
decisions, but to date the fallout has not been significant. 159 
Kitzhaber is in a solidly Democratic state, and he was transparent 
about his position on the death penalty in his most recent run for 
Governor.160 If Oregon lawmakers study the death penalty question 
and assess its costs and benefits for taxpayers, perhaps they will 
follow the path of New Jersey, New Mexico and Illinois, all of which 
have repealed the death penalty in recent years. As for Kasich, 
Professor Doug Berman, an expert on sentencing policy, has praised 
the Governor’s “already impressive clemency record,” noting that he 
has “made more profound and effective use of his state clemency 
authority in just the last three months than US President Barack 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. 
 159. To be sure, there have been early critics of the clemency decisions, as both Governors 
undoubtedly knew there would be. One prosecutor in the state said of the Governor’s decision: “It is 
arrogant and presumptuous for an elected official, up to and including the governor, to say, `I don’t care 
with the voters say, I don’t care what the courts say,’ and impose his own opinion.” Jonathan J. Cooper, 
John Kitzhaber, Oregon Governor, Imposes Moratorium On Death Penalty For Rest Of His Term, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/23/death-penalty-ban-
oregon_n_1109350.html. It is worth noting that this objection argues too much in that it represents 
opposition to any acts of gubernatorial clemency, something which the Oregon Constitution authorizes. 
See OR. CONST. art. V, § 14. It is also worth noting that there have been very positive reactions to these 
clemency grants in the mainstream press. See, e.g., Mark Osler, Oregon’s Death Penalty Halt Merciful 
and Right, CNN OPINION (Nov. 25, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-25/opinion/opinion_osler-
oregon-death-penalty_1_death-penalty-john-kitzhaber-reprieve?_s=PM:OPINION. 
 160. See Eric Nisley & Walt Beglau, Death Penalty: Respecting the Will of Voters, OREGONIAN (Dec. 
3, 2011), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/12/death_penality_respecting_the.html 
(criticizing the Governor’s decision but noting that his position had never been a secret). 
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Obama has in over the last three years.”161 Kasich’s approach may be 
more sustainable in the long run to the extent that it is perceived as 
judicious. In any event, the actions of these Governors from both 
sides of the political aisle stand as modern examples of robust state 
clemency. 
Even more recently, outgoing Mississippi Governor Haley 
Barbour granted clemency to 215 individuals, including twenty-six 
inmates who were released from prison.162 In Barbour’s case the 
public outcry was pronounced, and there are lawsuits pending today 
that challenge the clemency grants.163 Yet, the Barbour example need 
not discredit the notion that clemency grants are politically doable 
today. Rather, the Barbour example provides important information 
about how clemency grants should be made. Specifically, boards, 
rather than individual governors, are better suited to making these 
decisions;164 clemency decisions and the reasoning behind them 
should be transparent; and executive actors need to anticipate and 
address concerns of the public as they announce their clemency 
decisions.165 In sum, the Barbour experience with clemency does not 
undermine the claim that robust clemency is politically doable; it 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Douglas Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Following Ohio Parole Board’s Recommendation, 
Gov Kasich Commutes Another Murderer’s Death Sentence, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Sept. 27, 
2011) http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2011/09/following-ohio-parole-
boards-recommendation-gov-kasich-commutes-another-murderers-death-sentence.html. 
 162. Haley Barbour, Statement of Former Gov. Haley Barbour on Clemency, 
GOVERNORBARBOUR.COM (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2011/dec/1.13barbourclemencystatement.html. 
 163. See, e.g., Mary Capps, Barbour’s Blatant Disregard for the Safety of Women, SUN HERALD 
(Biloxi, Miss.), Jan. 20, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 1285237 (describing one particular source of 
anger about the pardons in letter to editor); Miss. High Court Takes Ex-gov Pardons Case, DELTA 
DEMOCRAT TIMES (Greenville, Miss.), Feb.1, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 2337072 (describing legal 
challenge to Barbour clemency decisions). 
 164. In the wake of the Barbour pardons, lawmakers in Mississippi are examining potential reforms to 
the state’s current clemency process which is left to the Governor’s sole discretion. See Phil West, 
Changes Due for Pardons—Bryant, Lawmakers Seek to Reduce Governor’s Authority, MEMPHIS COM. 
APPEAL, Jan. 13, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 870274; see also infra Part III (discussing the 
rationale for a clemency board). 
 165. In Gov. Barbour’s case, he eloquently explained his decision to grant clemency in 215 cases, but 
his explanation came after his announcement of the grants. See Haley Barbour, Why I Released 26 
Prisoners, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/haley-barbour-on-his-
pardons-of-mississippi-prisoners/2012/01/17/gIQAtOuG9P_story.html. 
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highlights the pitfalls to avoid when making these important 
decisions. 
Above and beyond actual cases of recent clemency grants, it is 
important to note that in recent years the entire political climate has 
changed, ushering in a host of reform measures that also would have 
been labeled “soft on crime” in another period.166 Specifically, the 
economic downturn has forced even states with the toughest record 
on criminal sanctions to reconsider sentencing policy. In 2007, Texas 
faced a projected prison population increase of up to 17,000 inmates 
within five years.167 Rather than spend the two billion dollars that 
would have been necessary to accommodate that population increase, 
the state spent a fraction of that figure establishing diversion and 
community based treatment programs.168 Newt Gingrich, a contender 
for the Republican presidential ticket, recently established the Right 
on Crime organization, articulating the view that the criminal justice 
status quo is not sustainable and that conservatives can and should 
lead criminal justice reform efforts.169 These are significant political 
changes, even in a very short period of time, and they are consistent 
with contemporary voter polls that suggest taxpayers no longer want 
to foot the bill for an ever-expanding prison population.170 To the 
extent that there is newfound, bipartisan support for holistic criminal 
justice reform, including decarceration efforts, one may view that 
support as a proxy for the viability of clemency today, as well. 
                                                                                                                 
 166. David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2011) 
(discussing recent signs of progress and political trend away from “tough on crime” positions). In recent 
years, there has been increasing bipartisan support for systemic reform. See, e.g., Shane D’Aprile, 
Gingrich Backs NAACP Effort on Criminal Justice Reform, HILL (Apr. 7, 2011, 9:35 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/gop-presidential-primary/154549-gingrich-backs-naacp-effort-on-
criminal-justice-reform (describing the Republican’s support for the NAACP criminal justice reform 
proposals); Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-
case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 167. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 3 (2010), 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Prison_Count_2010.pdf. 
 168. Id.; see also AM. CIV. LIB. UNION, supra note 16 (highlighting Texas reforms). 
 169. See generally Statement of Principles, supra note 166; Steve Yoder, The GOP, “Tough on 
Crime” No More?, SALON (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/11/07/the_gop_tough_on_crime_no_more/. 
 170. See, e.g., Jack Dolan, Californians Would Rather Ease Penalties Than Pay for More Prisons, 
L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/21/local/la-me-poll-prisons-20110721. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Plata last term has 
provided state executive actors with an important shield if they 
choose to revive state clemency in this time of crisis.171 That is, Plata 
made clear that systemic lawsuits challenging prison overcrowding 
and conditions of confinement have more than a chance of success—
they have an ally in the Court.172 State executive actors can use this 
to their advantage should they choose to pursue a methodical and 
judicious clemency agenda. In some states, for example, particularly 
those that have experienced prison litigation, executive actors can 
frame the question as who chooses who will leave prison before the 
end of their sentence rather than whether any inmates will do so. 
Framed this way, voters may prefer that an elected state official (or 
an appointed state board) do the choosing rather than a remote 
federal judge.   
For all of these reasons, clemency in a time of crisis not only is 
theoretically defensible, but it may be politically doable—even 
advantageous—under the right circumstances. 
III. QUESTIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Having made the theoretical and practical case for clemency today, 
in this Part of the Article I address questions of implementation, 
specifically: 1) who should make clemency decisions? and 2) who 
should benefit from clemency grants? 
A. Who Should Make Clemency Decisions? 
Who—or what body of people—should render clemency 
decisions? As noted at the outset of this Article, states vary in their 
clemency protocols: in fifteen states the Governor has the sole 
decision-making authority; in eight states the Governor must have the 
recommendation of a board or panel; in ten states, the Governor may 
receive a non-binding recommendation from a board; and in five 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 172. Id. 
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states a board alone makes clemency decisions.173 Alexander 
Hamilton advised that a sole executive was best suited to make 
clemency decisions on the theory that “a single man of prudence and 
good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the 
motives which may plead for and against the remission of the 
punishment, than any numerous body whatever.”174 And yet there is 
broad academic support for the model of an administrative clemency 
board.175 Professor Heise’s empirical work demonstrated that “the 
manner in which states structure clemency decision-making authority 
matters.”176 Specifically, boards are more likely to generate favorable 
clemency decisions.177 This should not be surprising given the degree 
to which politicians perceive clemency grants as politically risky—
even if that perception is exaggerated. Boards can provide some 
protection from that political risk. 
Yet, boards in their own right are not a perfect solution. If they are 
too large, the sense of responsibility experienced by any single board 
member may be too diffuse, and decisions may be made with less 
than full care and attention.178 Moreover, boards require procedural 
safeguards in order to function effectively.179 
Colorado offers a good case in point. In 2006, Colorado enacted a 
statute that precluded life-without-parole sentences for juvenile 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Clemency, supra note 43. 
 174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 175. Heise, supra note 9, at 301; see also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE 
RESOURCE GUIDE 5–6 (2005), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/Collateral%20Consequences/execsumm.pdf (noting that 
states that have issued most pardons have a board protected from political process); Daniel T. Kobil, 
How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 228–32 (despite flaws, 
clemency boards still more desirable alternative); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: 
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 622–36 (describing the value of a 
clemency commission in its ideal form). 
 176. Heise, supra note 9, at 301. 
 177. Id.; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, The Georgia Immigration Pardons: A Case Study in Mass 
Clemency, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 184 (2001) (describing a historical example of a clemency board in 
action). 
 178. See generally Adam Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & 
POL. 669 (2001). 
 179. Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court Reliance on Commutation to Ensure 
Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 370–71 (1996) (describing a citizen selection 
board). 
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offenders, but the law did not apply retroactively.180 As a result, 
forty-eight juvenile offenders in Colorado were left serving life-
without-parole sentences.181 In 2007 Colorado Governor Bill Ritter 
formed the state’s Juvenile Clemency Board by executive order.182 
The Board was tasked with reviewing clemency and commutation 
requests by juvenile inmates who were tried as adults and sentenced 
to state prison.183 The Juvenile Clemency Board would have been the 
optimal vehicle for consideration of those forty-eight life-without-
parole cases, and yet more than three years later, that Board has 
considered twelve juvenile life-without-parole cases and it has 
granted to clemency to none of them.184 
This inefficacy can be attributed to several factors: the law-
enforcement-heavy composition of the Board, the total lack of 
transparency in the Board’s process and decision-making, and the 
fact that, at the end of the day, the Governor retains the sole authority 
to render clemency decisions.185 Because the Juvenile Clemency 
Board has proven so ineffective at addressing the juvenile life-
without-parole issues, state lawmakers plan to ask the current 
Governor John Hickenlooper to assess whether the Juvenile 
Clemency Board is meeting its mandate.186 In any event, the 
Colorado Juvenile Clemency Board demonstrates that a board is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to an effective and fair 
clemency system. 
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 181. Id. 
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prison. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Espinosa, supra note 180. 
 185. Gene Davis, Frustration Over Juvenile Clemency Board, DENVER DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2009), 
http://www.statebillnews.com/2009/07/frustration-over-juvenile-clemency-board/; Ensslin, supra note 
182. 
 186. Patrick Malone, Bill to Adjust Juvenile Life Term Dies, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.chieftain.com/news/local/bill-to-adjust-juvenile-life-terms-dies/article_84fa7a90-60d3-11e0-
87af-001cc4c002e0.html. 
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Rather, certain procedural safeguards are needed.187 First, the 
composition of the Board should be representative of the public 
rather than heavily favoring the perspective of the law-enforcement 
community. Voices from the law-enforcement community are 
important, but they should be tempered by the voices of, for example, 
those who advocate for holistic criminal justice reform and effective 
re-entry. Second, the Board should reflect diversity in race, ethnicity 
and gender.188 Third, the Board should be operating under clear and 
specific guidelines as to clemency decisions, and those guidelines 
should be made transparent, especially to inmates applying for 
clemency. The criteria may need to vary by jurisdiction, but some 
common features should be: the extent to which there is doubt about 
the actual innocence of the applicant; the extent to which the inmate 
is serving a sentence disproportionate to what co-defendants or 
similarly situated defendants are serving; the extent to which an 
applicant has rehabilitated himself; the extent to which the inmate has 
been a resource to others within the prison system; the extent to 
which the inmate is suffering from mental or physical health 
problems that make the current sentence excessive; and the extent to 
which the inmate was deprived of his right to the effective assistance 
of counsel.189 Scholars have recognized that clemency boards are not 
perfect, but I join the camp of those who think such boards are the 
best hope for robust clemency at the state level. 
B. Who Should Benefit from Clemency? 
As to the question of who should benefit from clemency grants, 
the short answer is: it depends on the jurisdiction. In this Article I 
have conceived of clemency primarily in its error-correcting 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See, e.g., Stephen E. Silverman, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: States Executive 
Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates’ Last Appeals, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 395–97 
(suggesting several procedural safeguards); see also Alyson Dinsmore, Comment: Clemency in Capital 
Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1825, 1853–57 (2002) (discussing 
additional safeguards and their introduction through statute). 
 188. Palacios, supra note 179, at 371. 
 189. See Cathleen Burnett, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. J. C.L. & 
C.R. 191, 192 (2003) (listing reasons for granting clemency); Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 1, at 3. 
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capacity. Accordingly, clemency should be deployed to correct errors 
that are specific to a given jurisdiction. 
For example, as I discussed in Part I of this Article, Florida houses 
the majority of inmates who were juvenile non-homicide offenders 
and who are now serving life-without-parole sentences.190 Those 
sentences are now unconstitutional, and yet the legislature has not 
been able to pass a law that would provide an alternative sentence to 
these inmates. Nor is a life sentence, with parole, available under 
state law.191 This is the kind of glaring error that clemency can 
readily address. The Board (on which the Governor sits in Florida) 
need not simply release these inmates. Instead it could look to other 
jurisdictions that have legislation regarding the sentencing of 
juveniles and commute the sentences to a term of years after which 
the juvenile offender becomes parole-eligible. Unless and until the 
inmate is equipped for parole, it need not be granted, but the option 
should be available. If presented well to the public, this act would not 
be political suicide. Rather, it can be framed (accurately) as an 
executive agency bringing the state into compliance with a Supreme 
Court mandate. 
In California, a different type of error-correction may be 
warranted. California’s death row houses more than 700 inmates—
making it by far the largest death row in the nation and almost twice 
the size of the next biggest death row, in Florida.192 At the same time, 
though, California has only executed thirteen inmates since the 
Supreme Court’s reauthorization of the death penalty.193 Housing 
someone on death row, as opposed to housing them in a maximum 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (citing P. ANNINO, D. RASMUSSEN & C. RICE, 
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO NATION 
(2009), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Report_juvenile_lwop_092009.pdf). 
The report estimated that there were 109 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving a life-without-parole 
sentence nationwide, seventy-seven of whom were in Florida. 
 191. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 192. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Feb. 24, 
2012). 
 193. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-
executions?exec_name_1=&sex=All&state%5B%5D=CA&sex_1=All&federal=All&foreigner=All&ju
venile=All&volunteer=All (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
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security prison for a non-capital crime, is incredibly expensive—to 
say nothing of the costs of legal representation in a capital case as 
opposed to a non-capital case.194 A recent California study estimates 
that it costs an additional $90,000 per year to house an inmate on 
death row instead of in a maximum security facility where an inmate 
serving life-without-parole would typically be housed. Given the size 
of California’s death row, the study estimates that commuting 
California’s death row population to life-without-parole sentences 
would save the state $170 million annually.195 Pennsylvania is in a 
similar position. With 219 inmates on death row, the state has the 
fourth largest death row in the nation.196 Yet it has only executed 
three people since 1976.197 In jurisdictions like California and 
Pennsylvania maintaining large death rows may no longer be 
feasible—or justifiable to taxpayers. By commuting these sentences 
to life-without-parole, state actors can remedy the error of excessive 
sentences while freeing up millions of tax dollars. 
While some problems are nationwide—like access to counsel and 
overreliance on incarceration—manifestations of these problems will 
vary from state to state. In other states, classes of offenders may not 
immediately come to mind, but instead, clemency should be pursued 
on several fronts: for those who may have been the victim of racial 
discrimination in sentencing; for those who have demonstrated 
significant rehabilitation; for those who suffered tremendous abuse 
that may explain, if not excuse, their actions; and for those who are 
elderly and in poor health. When executive actors exercise their 
clemency authority, they should take these regional differences and 
priorities into account. 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Charles Riley, One California Budget Fix: Abolish Death Row, CNN MONEY (June 20, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/20/news/economy/california_death_penalty/index.htm. 
 195. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., California Cost Study 2011, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/california-cost-study-2011 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 196. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2012), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
 197. Id. 
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C. Public Education 
Finally, a word about public education is in order. For a revitalized 
clemency model to be viable, the public needs to be aware of both the 
fiscal and social costs of current corrections policies. To some extent, 
this public education process is already underway. As I discussed in 
Part II of this Article, the recession has forced some changes in 
criminal justice policy. In addition, the Plata decision has been 
covered widely by national newspapers, drawing attention to our 
nation’s mass incarceration epidemic. Yet, the promising bipartisan 
support for significant criminal justice reform has not received the 
media attention that it deserves. 
Advocates of criminal justice reform, including clemency reform, 
should pursue a localized education plan that responds to pressing 
voter concerns. For example, the California state budget crisis is due 
to many factors, but it is related to the state’s last three decades of 
criminalization and prison expansion.198 California Governor Jerry 
Brown’s proposed 2012-2013 budget allocated roughly the same 
amount of funding for higher education as it did for corrections.199 
While California voters are indeed vocally angry about the state’s 
slashing of public education funds, 200 voters may not know that only 
one decade ago, California allocated more than twice as much 
                                                                                                                 
 198. California is in the midst of implementing a plan to reduce its prison population. Richard Winton 
& Andrew Blankstein, California Jails Receiving More State Prisoners Than Expected, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/16/local/la-me-11-15-jails-20111116 (describing the 
state’s “realignment” process under which state prisoners are being moved to county jails in order to 
comply with a Supreme Court ordered prison population reduction). Even with the court-ordered 
reduction, though, California’s prison population is at a historic high. JOSEPH M. HAYES, PUB. POLICY 
INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S CHANGING PRISON POPULATION (2011), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_PrisonsJTF.pdf (describing a 73% prison population increase 
between 1990 and 2005). 
 199. CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FIN., GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY—2012–2013, at 19, available at 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/SummaryCharts.pdf (showing 7.8% of expenditures 
going toward corrections and 7.1% going to higher education). 
 200. See, e.g., Maria L. La Ganga & Carla Rivera, Students Protest at Several California Universities, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/15/local/la-me-college-occupy-
20111116 (describing college students’ protests regarding tuition increases and education cuts); 
Anthony York & Nicholas Riccardi, Deeper Cuts to State Budget Expected, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/17/local/la-me-state-budget-20111117 (describing parent 
and teacher protests in response to education funding cuts). 
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funding to higher education as it did to adult and youth corrections.201 
Sentencing reformers need to make explicit the link between prison 
expansion and education cuts. Only when the public is well-educated 
about the costs of current corrections policies will citizens fully 
understand the benefits, and admittedly, the risks,202 of reviving state 
clemency. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have discussed two of our nation’s most pressing 
criminal justice failings: the ongoing indigent defense crisis and our 
overreliance on incarceration. I have further suggested that state 
actors can justify their robust use of clemency today in response to 
these ongoing, systemic failures. By way of conclusion, I want to 
mention two caveats. First, the fact that I have conceived of 
clemency in its error-correcting capacity in this Article does not 
mean that I view this as clemency’s exclusive role. Even if we were 
to make effective representation available as a matter of course to 
criminal defendants and even if we were to dramatically reduce our 
reliance on incarceration, clemency would still have an important 
place in our system—just as it did in when our Constitution was 
drafted. Second, a revitalized and robust clemency power at the state 
level cannot replace thoughtful, bipartisan legislative reforms 
designed to address these criminal justice failings. States with truly 
broken indigent defense systems need to begin with the basics: a 
state-funded system that is independent of political and judicial 
influence; workload limits that respect the demands of effective 
representation; and resource parity between the defense and 
prosecutorial functions. Likewise, our current reliance on 
incarceration requires systemic reforms such as expanded bail and 
parole opportunities; diversion and decriminalization; and a renewed 
                                                                                                                 
 201. GOVERNOR’S BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS, 2000-2001, CAL. DEPT. OF FINANCE, at 83, available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2000-01/documents/Highlights00-01.pdf (showing corrections 
expenditures as 5.8% of total expenditures and higher education as 11.5%). 
 202. With any proposed clemency plan, there is the risk that a released inmate will commit another 
crime. 
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emphasis on rehabilitation so that offenders are prepared to re-enter 
society and avoid recidivism. Unless and until state legislatures take 
up these measures, though, state actors are amply justified in using 
clemency judiciously to correct errors that flow from these systemic 
failures. 
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